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Abstract This paper considers the semantics of Navajo internally-headed relative
clauses (IHRCs) with quantified heads. The results of storyboard-based fieldwork
show that when the quantifier ’ałníí’dóó ‘half’ occurs in RC-internal position, it
necessarily takes RC-internal scope. This result suggests that Navajo IHRCs are
amenable to analyses given to Japanese IHRCs (Hoshi 1995; Shimoyama 1999)
but challenges claims by Faltz (1995) and Grosu (2012), who argue that t’áá ’ałtso
‘all’ invariably takes RC-external scope. We show that while IHRCs with t’áá
’ałtso do not have precisely the truth conditions expected for EHRCs, their truth
conditions differ from what might be expected given a Shimoyama-style IHRC
analysis (paceGrosu 2012). However, we consider one way to explain this behavior
while maintaining surface scope for all Navajo quantifiers.
Keywords: Navajo, Dene, Athabaskan, internally-headed relative clauses, semantic field-
work, quantification
1 Introduction
A prominent topic in the study of internally-headed relative clauses (IHRCs) crosslin-
guistically is whether they have the same truth conditions as minimally different
externally-headed relative clauses (EHRCs). Work on Japanese (Hoshi 1995; Shi-
moyama 1999) and Korean (Kim 2007) demonstrates that IHRCs in these languages
are truth-conditionally distinct from their EHRC counterparts:
(1) a. Taro-wa
T.-TOP
[[Yoko-ga
Y.-NOM
reezooko-ni
refrigerator-LOC
kukkii-o
cookie-ACC
hotondo
most
irete-oita]-no]-o
put-AUX-NO-ACC
paatii-ni
party-to
motte itta.
brought
‘Yoko put {most of the cookies}1 in the refrigerator and Taro brought
them1 to the party.’ IHRC
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b. Taro-wa
T.-TOP
[[Yoko-ga
Y.-NOM
reezooko-ni
refrigerator-LOC
irete-oita]
put-AUX
kukkii-o
cookie-ACC
hotondo]
most
paatii-ni
party-to
motte itta.
brought
‘Taro brought to the party most of the cookies that Yoko had put in the
refrigerator.’ EHRC
(Shimoyama 1999: (4), (5))
Shimoyama demonstrates that the Japanese sentence in (1a) can only convey
that Yoko put the majority of the cookies in the fridge, and Taro brought all of those
to the party. By contrast, (1b) can only convey that Taro brought the majority of
the cookies Yoko put in the fridge. Shimoyama (1999) argues that this contrast
arises because the quantified head in the IHRC (1a) is interpreted RC-internally.
The IHRC is a closed sentence that is coordinated with the matrix clause. An E-
type pronoun in the matrix clause refers to the maximal individual denoted by the
IHRC.1 This is reflected in the translation of (1a) via coordinated root clauses.
However, Grosu (2012) argues that this analysis is not right for IHRCs in Navajo
(Dene/Athabaskan; Na-Dene). Citing Faltz’s (1995; 2000) translations and com-
ments, Grosu argues that the universal quantifier t’áá ’ałtso ‘all’ associated with
the internal head in (2) is obligatorily interpreted with RC-external scope.
(2) [Łéécha˛a˛’í
dog
t’áá ’ałtso]
all
’ashkii
boy
deishxash]-ígíí
PL.3OBJ.3SBJ.bite.PFV-IGII
nidahał’in.
PL.3SBJ.bark.IPFV
‘All the dogs that bit the boy are barking.’ (Faltz 1995: 305 (106))
This paper presents fieldwork results that show that at least some Navajo quan-
tifiers must take RC-internal scope when pronounced RC-internally. We focus on
examples with ’ałníí’dóó ‘half’ (3), which we found were accepted in contexts
consistent with ’ałníí’dóó having RC-internal scope (3a) but rejected in contexts
consistent with RC-external scope (3b).
(3) [Mary
M.
’aghaa’
wool
’ałníí’dóó
half
yizdiz]-é˛e˛
3OBJ.3SBJ.spin.PFV-IGII
Alice
A.
yiyííłchíí’.
3OBJ.3SBJ.dye.red.PFV
a. Internal ‘half’: Mary spun half of the wool. Alice dyed it. X(3)
b. External ‘half’: Alice dyed half of the wool that Mary spun. #(3)
1 See Grosu & Landman (2012) for an alternative analysis of Japanese relative clauses.
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The paper has the following structure. Section 2 gives an overview of Navajo
relative clauses and analyses by Platero (1974) and Willie (1989). We also present
preliminary discussion of claims by Faltz (1995, 2000) and Grosu (2012) about
quantifier scope in Navajo IHRCs. Section 3 presents elicitation evidence about
the scope of ’ałníí’dóó ‘half’ in (3). Section 4 reconsiders Grosu’s (2012) claims
about Navajo IHRCs with universal quantifiers: we claim that the truth conditions
of sentences differ from those of English EHRCs. Section 5 concludes.
2 Background on Navajo IHRCs
2.1 Basics of Navajo sentences and IHRCs
Navajo verb words are morphologically complex structures that always bear mark-
ers indicating person and number of event participants (Young & Morgan 1987).
Lexical noun phrases can be used to add more information about event participants
as in (4), but need not be included (5). The morphological marking on the verb does
not vary with the presence of external noun phrases.
(4) Sam
S.
łí˛ı˛’
horse
yizloh.
3OBJ.3SBJ.rope.PFV
‘Sam roped the horse.’
(5) Yizloh.
3OBJ.3SBJ.rope.PFV
‘S/he roped it/him/her.’
Navajo typically has SOV word order but OSV order is also attested, such as
when the object has particular length, such as when the object is an IHRC (6)
(6) [Mary
M.
’aghaa’
wool
yizdiz]-é˛e˛
3OBJ.3SBJ.spin.PFV-IGII
Alice
A.
yiyííłchíí’.
3OBJ.3SBJ.dye.red.PFV
‘Alice dyed red the wool that Mary spun.’
The morphosyntax of Navajo relative clauses was first discussed in significant
detail by Platero (1974). All relative clauses in Navajo bear a special morpheme at
their right edge, variably realized as -é˛e˛ (6), -á˛a˛ (7a) or, most commonly, -ígíí (7b).
The morphemes -á˛a˛ and -é˛e˛ are preferred by speakers when the RC describes an
event or state that held prior to speech time (Platero 1974; Smith, Perkins & Fernald
2007), but -ígíí can be substituted (Ellavina Perkins, p.c.). To simplify, we use -ígíí
in text and IGII in glosses to stand for all markers.2
2 The marker -ígíí also marks clausal complements to certain verbs (Schauber 1979). It is crosslin-
guistically common to find the same marker on both IHRCs and clausal complements (Culy 1990;
722
Navajo in the typology of internally-headed relatives
(7) a. [Tł’éédá˛á˛’
last.night
’ashkii
boy
’ałhá˛á˛’]-á˛a˛
3SBJ.snore.IPFV-IGII
yádoołtih.
3SBJ.speak.FUT
‘The boy who was snoring last night will speak.’
(Platero 1974: 204 (12))
b. [K’ad
now
t’éiyá
just
’ashkii
boy
’ałhá˛á˛’]-ígíí
3SBJ.snore.IPFV-IGII
yádoołtih.
3SBJ.speak.FUT
‘The boy who is snoring right now will speak.’
As Platero (1974) observes, (7) must be an IHRC: there is no conceivable syntactic
parse in which ’ashkii ‘boy’ occupies a syntactic position external to the relative
clause since ’ashkii is preceded by an expression tł’éédá˛á˛’ ‘last night’ that cannot
modify the future-marked main clause verb.
Apart from the presence of -ígíí, Navajo relative clauses are indistinguishable
from independent clauses. Navajo relative clauses contain no independent relative
pronouns. Removing -ígíí from an IHRC leaves a complete clause:
(8) Tł’éédá˛á˛’
last.night
’ashkii
boy
’ałhá˛á˛’.
3SBJ.snore.IPFV
‘The boy was snoring last night.’
Note that Platero (1974) also gives examples of EHRCs in Navajo:
(9) %[Tł’éédá˛á˛’
last.night
’ałhá˛á˛’]-á˛a˛
3SBJ.snore.IPFV-IGII
’ashkii
boy
yádoołtih.
3SBJ.speak.FUT
‘The boy who was snoring last night will speak.’ (Platero 1974: 204 (11))
Platero notes that sentences like (9) are dispreferred in comparison with IHRCs.
Other speakers go even further, however: Willie (1989) marks examples like (9) as
ungrammatical and our consultant also rejected such examples (E. Perkins, p.c.).
2.2 Previous treatments of Navajo relative clauses
Platero (1974) and Willie (1989) present two different syntactic analyses of Navajo
relative clauses. Platero (1974: (204)) proposes that a string like (10) underlies
Navajo relative clauses, such that a copy of the head occurs in both clauses:
(10) [Tł’éédá˛á˛’
last.night
’ashkii
boy
’ałhá˛á˛’]-á˛a˛
3SBJ.snore.IPFV-IGII
’ashkii
boy
yádoołtih.
3SBJ.speak.FUT
Kim 2009). See Kim (2009) and Bogal-Allbritten & Moulton (To appear) for a unified account of
Korean kes, a marker with the same apparent distribution as -ígíí.
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Platero writes that the copies are linked by a “relative connection" but does
not elaborate on the nature of this connection. This account recalls (at least su-
perficially) matching analyses of English relative clauses by Carlson (1977) and
Sauerland (2003), among others, in which a silent operator mediates between the
RC-external head and the RC-internal copy.
Willie (1989) presents a very different analysis of Navajo relative clauses.3
Willie observes that relative clauses do not require an overt lexical noun to serve
as the head (11a). In such examples, the relative clause is translated as ‘the one(s)
who’ or ‘the one(s) that.’ This is the standard strategy for forming new nouns (11b).
(11) a. [’Ałhá˛á˛’]-ígíí
3SBJ.snore.IPFV-IGII
yádoołtih.
3SBJ.speak.FUT
‘The one who is snoring will speak.’
b. [Ni’
earth
bítł’áahdi
3POSS.bottom.LOC
’áhoot’eii
conditions
ndeiłkaah]-ígíí
PL.3OBJ.3SBJ.investigate.IPFV-IGII
‘those who investigate the bottom of the Earth’ (geologists)
(Young & Morgan 1987: 638)
Willie proposes that -ígíí is a nominal head that can convert complete clauses
into referential expressions.4 This is the function of -ígíí regardless the presence of
a lexical head noun within the relative clause. When a lexical head noun is present
inside a relative clause (12b), the head introduced by -ígíí is (somehow) identified
with ’ashkii ‘boy’ (Willie 1989: 416).
(12) a. [shizts’o˛s]-yé˛e˛
1OBJ.3SBJ.kiss.PFV-IGII
‘the one such that that s/he kissed me’
b. [’ashkii
boy
shizts’o˛s]-yé˛e˛
1OBJ.3SBJ.kiss.PFV-IGII
‘the boy + the one such that he kissed me’ (Willie 1989: 414 (25))
Neither Platero (1974) nor Willie (1989) discusses in detail the semantic im-
plications of their proposals. However, their analyses suggest possible differences
in the height at which the head (and any material associated with the head, such
as modifiers or quantifiers) will be interpreted. For Platero, sentences with relative
3 Willie’s proposal for IHRCs is part of her larger program to apply Jelinek’s (1984) Pronominal
Argument Hypothesis to Navajo, such that all lexical nouns are adjuncts that corefer to pronominal
argument markers on the verb.
4 Willie does not discuss EHRCs since they are ungrammatical for her, as noted above.
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clauses always contain two copies of the head, regardless of which one is pro-
nounced. We might predict, then, that the head and any associated material will
be able to take scope outside of the relative clause, even when pronounced RC-
internally. For Willie, by contrast, relative clauses are created by the attachment
of -ígíí to a closed sentence. As such, we predict that the head and any associated
material will have RC-internal scope.
2.3 Faltz, Grosu: Internal heads and quantifiers with external scope
While they do not directly address Platero and Willie’s analyses, Faltz (1995, 2000)
and Grosu (2012) address the question of the height of interpretation for heads and
quantifiers in Navajo relative clauses. They discuss the sentences in (13), in which
the head nouns (łéécha˛a˛’í ‘dog’ (13a), chidí ‘car’ (13b)) and universal quantifier
t’áá ’ałtso ‘all’ are pronounced in RC-internal position.
(13) a. [Łéécha˛a˛’í
dog
t’áá ’ałtso]
all
’ashkii
boy
deishxash]-ígíí
PL.3OBJ.3SBJ.bite.PFV-IGII
nidahał’in.
PL.3SBJ.bark.IPFV
‘All the dogs that bit the boy are barking.’ (Faltz 1995: 305 (106))
b. [John
J.
Bill
B.
t’áá ’ałtso
all
chidí
car
yaa
3OBJ.from
nayiisnii’]-é˛e˛
3OBJ.3SBJ.buy.PFV-IGII
t’éiyaá
only
nizhóniígo
well
nídaajeeh.
PL.3SBJ.run.IPFV
‘All the cars that John bought from Bill (and only those) run well.’
(Faltz 1995: 305 (107))
Faltz (1995, 2000) and Grosu (2012) both suggest that although pronounced
RC-internally, the quantifier t’áá ’ałtso ‘all’ takes scope outside of the relative
clause. This is reflected in Faltz’s translations of (13) as EHRCs. Of (13a), Faltz
writes that t’áá ’ałtso must not interpreted inside the relative clause “because the
semantic interpretation of the relative clause alone would imply that all the dogs
bit John” (Faltz 1995: 304), an interpretation which Faltz implies is unavailable
for (13a). Similarly, Grosu asserts that (13b) conveys neither that all of John’s cars
were bought from Bill, or that John bought all of Bill’s cars (Grosu 2012: 470).
On the basis of these observations, Grosu concludes that there is no difference in
interpretation between Navajo IHRCs with universally quantified heads and “min-
imally different EHRCs.” This sets Navajo apart from Japanese, where the truth
conditions differ depending on where the quantifiers are pronounced.
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2.4 Reviewing Faltz and Grosu
There are several places where Faltz and Grosu’s claims require further attention.
First, while both assert that sentences like (13) have the same interpretation as min-
imally distinct EHRCs, they do not explicitly compare the relevant sentence pairs.
Indeed, as noted above, it may not be possible to test sentences in which the nominal
head is pronounced RC-externally, since most speakers reject such strings. How-
ever, our consultant accepted sentences like (14) in which the quantifier was pro-
nounced in RC-external position. If the universal quantifier t’áá ’ałtso ‘all’ has RC-
external scope even when pronounced RC-internally, we might expect that (13a) is
true in the same contexts as (14). We test such minimal pairs below.
(14) [Łéécha˛a˛’í
dog
’ashkii
boy
deishxash]-ígíí
PL.3OBJ.3SBJ.bite.PFV-IGII
t’áá ’ałtso
all
nidahał’in.
PL.3SBJ.bark.IPFV
Second, the tools used to examine the truth conditions of (13) deserve a closer
look. Both sentences are given translations into English with EHRCs, but it is not
clear how these translations were elicited. AsMatthewson (2004) notes, translations
are at best partial clues about meaning: they may give an especially inaccurate or
incomplete picture of a sentence’s truth conditions if the language of translation
(English) lacks a straightforward correlate to the construction of interest (IHRCs).
We will discuss in detail all contexts that were used to elicit judgments.
Finally, Faltz and Grosu’s discussion is restricted to IHRCs with the universal
quantifier t’áá ’ałtso. As such, Grosu notes that he cannot say whether his proposed
analysis will suffice for all Navajo IHRCs. We also believe that universal quanti-
fiers are not an ideal for determining scope in sentences with relative clauses. The
key examples from Shimoyama (1999) contain the proportional quantifier hotondo
‘most’ because its scope impacts truth conditions in a clear way.
(15) a. IHRC (1a): ‘Yoko put {most of the cookies}1 in the refrigerator and
Taro brought them1 to the party.’
b. EHRC (1b): ‘Taro brought to the party most of the cookies that Yoko
had put in the refrigerator.’
We can construct pairs of contexts where one context (16a) verifies only the
IHRC paraphrase while the other (16b) verifies only the EHRC paraphrase.
(16) a. IHRC only: Yoko put away only 8/10 cookies. Taro brought all 8.
b. EHRC only: Yoko put away 10/10 cookies. Taro brought only 8.
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However, a confound is presented by paraphrases with universal quantifiers.
The hypothetical paraphrases in (17) for (13a) are based on Shimoyama (1999).
(17) a. IHRC: ‘{All of the dogs}1 bit the boy. They1 are barking.’
b. EHRC: ‘All of the dogs that bit the boy are barking.’
It is true that we can construct contexts in which only the EHRC paraphrase is
verified (18): if (13a) is true in this scenario, then we can conclude that (13a) does
not necessarily have a Shimoyama-style IHRC structure. The truth of (13a) in (18)
could be taken as evidence for the possibility of RC-external scope by t’áá ’ałtso in
Navajo (although we will reconsider this conclusion in section 4).
(18) EHRC only: 8/10 dogs barking. All 8 bit the boy.
But there is no ‘IHRC only’ context parallel to (16a), which can unambiguously
diagnose an IHRC structure for a sentence like (13a). Any context that verifies the
IHRC paraphrase in (17a) will also verify the EHRC paraphrase in (17b): if it is
true that ‘all of the dogs bit the boy,’ then there is equivalence between the sets all
of the dogs and all of the dogs that bit the boy.
Because of the difficulties posed by universal quantifiers, our fieldwork first fo-
cused on the interpretation of Navajo relative clauses with proportional quantifier
’ałníí’dóó ‘half,’ which should — and, we argue, do — differ clearly in their in-
terpretation based on the quantifier’s scope (section 3). Section 4 returns to IHRCs
with t’áá ’ałtso ‘all.’
3 ‘Half’: Interpreted RC-internally when pronounced RC-internally
3.1 Eliciting results for ’ałníí’dóó ‘half’
We examined the sentences in (19), which differ in whether the proportional quan-
tifier ’ałníí’dóó ‘half’ occurs clause internally (19a) or clause externally (19b).
The consultant judged both word orders to be well-formed.5 If Faltz (1995, 2000)
and Grosu (2012) are right that heads and associated material take obligatory RC-
external scope, we predict that (19a) and (19b) will both have the same truth condi-
tions as the English sentence in (19c).
(19) a. [Mary
M.
’aghaa’
wool
’ałníí’dóó
half
yizdiz]-é˛e˛
3OBJ.3SBJ.spin.PFV-IGII
Alice
A.
yiyííłchíí’.
3OBJ.3SBJ.dye.red.PFV
5 Since our consultant always rejected sentences with the nominal head pronounced RC-externally,
we do not consider that configuration.
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Figure 1 RC-internal interpretation of ‘half’.
b. [Mary
M.
’aghaa’
wool
yizdiz]-é˛e˛
3OBJ.3SBJ.spin.PFV-IGII
’ałníí’dóó
half
Alice
A.
yiyííłchíí’.
3OBJ.3SBJ.dye.red.PFV
c. Alice dyed red half of the wool that Mary spun.
We elicited judgments about these sentences with short storyboards, which are
sequences of pictures designed to elicit or test constructions of interest (Burton &
Matthewson 2015). Storyboards allow the fieldworker to set up complex contexts
with less interference from the translation language. We showed the consultant each
storyboard and asked if (19a) and (19b) were natural continuations.
Figure 1 targets an RC-internal interpretation of ’ałníí’dóó. The story begins
with a quantity of wool (Panel 1), half of which Mary spins (Panel 2). Alice dyes
red all of the spun wool but leaves the loose wool undyed (Panel 3). In this story,
‘half’ only applies to the wool involved in the relative clause event.
After viewing Figure 1, the consultant only accepted the sentence with RC-
internal ’ałníí’dóó (19a) and made the comment in (20a). She rejected the sentence
with RC-external ’ałníí’dóó (19b).
(20) Context: Figure 1
a. (19a) accepted. Comment: “Half goes with the spinning."
b. #(19b)
Figure 2 targets an RC-external interpretation of ’ałníí’dóó. The story again
begins with a quantity of wool (Panel 1) but all of the wool is spun by Mary (Panel
2). Alice subsequently dyes half of the spun wool, leaving the other balls of spun
wool undyed (Panel 3). In this story, ‘half’ applies to the wool involved in the main
clause event.
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Figure 2 RC-external interpretation of ‘half’
The consultant rejected the sentence with RC-internal ’ałníí’dóó (19a) in the context
of Figure 2. She accepted (19b) with ’ałníí’dóó in RC-external position and gave
the comment in (21b).
(21) Context: Figure 2
a. #(19a)
b. (19b) accepted. Comment: “[You would use this sentence because]
you’re saying that Alice only dyed half of the yarn.”
To summarize the results for ’ałníí’dóó, it appears that the height at which this
quantifier is interpreted necessarily matches the height at which it is pronounced.
This is not what we would expect under Grosu’s proposal that quantifiers in Navajo
relative clauses take external scope even when pronounced in RC-internal position.
3.2 A Shimoyama-style account of IHRCs with ‘half’
The behavior of RCs with ’ałníí’dóó matches the behavior of Japanese IHRCs with
quantified heads (Hoshi 1995; Shimoyama 1999), where quantifiers in RCs are in-
terpreted at the height at which they are pronounced. As such, an account based
on Shimoyama (1999) seems promising for the Navajo IHRCs seen in this section.
Before considering its applicability to Navajo, however, we will first review the key
pieces of Shimoyama’s account.
Shimoyama (1999) builds on Hoshi (1995) to propose that internal heads and
associated quantifiers do not covertly raise out of relative clauses in Japanese. In a
sentence like (22a), then, the quantifier dono ‘every’ takes scope within the IHRC,
quantifying over all the newspapers in the relevant domain. The IHRC is interpreted
as a closed sentence that is adjoined to the main clause at LF. A rough LF for (22a)
is shown in (22b).
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(22) a. Taro-wa
T.-TOP
[[ Hanako-ga
H.-NOM
dono
every
sinbun-mo
newspaper
katte kita]-no]-o
buy.came-NMLZ-ACC
tanani
on.shelf
narabeta.
placed
‘Hanako bought every newspaper and Taro shelved them.’
b. [IHRC Hanako bought every newspaper] & [ Taro shelved [DP no P3 ]]
The main clause contains an E-type pronoun (underlined) with internal com-
plexity. Shimoyama (1999) takes the nominalizer no to be akin to a definite deter-
miner, a maximalizing operator that takes as complement a contextually-supplied
property variable P (type he,ti) and returns a maximal individual (23a). In this
context, the assignment function gc values P as the property of being newspapers
bought by Hanako (23b). The maximal individual of which P3 holds is the object
in the main clause (23c).
(23) a. Jno(P3)K = max. individual a such that P(a)
b. gc := [ 3! lxe. x is newspapers that Hanako bought]
c. J(22b)K H. bought every newspaper & T. shelved the newspapers
that H. bought
We can sketch an account of the same general shape for our Navajo sentence
with RC-internal ’ałníí’dóó repeated in (24a). As in Japanese, the IHRC is a closed
sentence that moves at LF to be coordinated with the matrix clause (24b). In a
context with an assignment function that includes the mapping in (24c), IGII4 is
interpreted as ‘the wool that Mary spun.’ (24d) gives the result.
(24) a. [Mary
M.
’aghaa’
wool
’ałníí’dóó
half
yizdiz]-é˛e˛
3OBJ.3SBJ.spin.PFV-IGII
Alice
A.
yiyííłchíí’.
3OBJ.3SBJ.dye.red.PFV
‘Mary spun half the wool, Alice dyed it red.’
b. [IHRC Mary spun half the wool] & [ Alice dyed IGII4 ]
c. gc := [ 4! lxe. x is wool that Mary spun ]
d. J(24a)K M. spun half the wool & A. dyed the wool that M. spun
Themarker -ígíí could be treated either as a maximalizing operator like Japanese
no or perhaps as a pronoun corresponding to Shimoyama’s free property-type vari-
able P. In both cases -ígíí would remain in the matrix clause at LF. Both views are
close to the kind of picture proposed by Willie (1989), who argued that -ígíí is a
nominalizer that is identified with the head of the relative clause.6
6 Treating -ígíí as a property-denoting expression could help us to account for an apparently indefinite
730
Navajo in the typology of internally-headed relatives
4 Universally Quantified Heads
4.1 Eliciting results for ‘all’
We now turn to Navajo IHRCs with universal quantifiers. As we did with ’ałníí’dóó,
we compare (25a) with (25b), which differ only in the position of t’áá ’ałtso ‘all.’
Based on their discussion of other IHRCs with t’áá ’ałtso, we assume that Faltz and
Grosu would assign (25a) and (25b) the truth conditions of English EHRC (25c).
(25) a. [Sam
S.
łí˛í˛’
horse
t’áá ’ałtso
all
deizloh]-á˛a˛
PL3OBJ.3SBJ.rope.PFV-IGII
Tom
T.
yída’diiłid.
PL.3OBJ.3SBJ.brand.PFV
b. [Sam
S.
łí˛í˛’
horse
deizloh]-á˛a˛
PL.3OBJ.3SBJ.rope.PFV-IGII
t’áá ’ałtso
all
Tom
T.
yída’diiłid.
PL.3OBJ.3SBJ.brand.PFV
c. Tom branded all of the horses that Sam roped.
The storyboard in Figure 3 depicts the kind of contexts alluded to by Faltz and
Grosu, where it is not the case that absolutely all entities in the context are involved
in the event described by the relative clause. Panel 1 shows seven horses, three of
which are roped by Sam (Panel 2). Tom then brands those three horses (Panel 3).
The English EHRC (25c) is true in this context. The consultant also accepted both
of the Navajo sentences (25a) and (25b) in this context.
(26) Context: Figure 3
a. (25a) accepted.
b. (25b) accepted.
This pattern of judgments seems to agree with the predictions of Grosu (2012)
and Faltz (1995, 2000). The felicity of (25a) is unexpected if the Navajo sentence
is subject to Shimoyama’s (1999) treatment of IHRCs with universal quantifiers
(22b): ‘Sam roped all of the horses and Tom branded them’ is not true in Figure 3
since four of the horses were not roped.
IHRC discussed by Grosu (2012). In addition, if we treat -ígíí as property-denoting, we could then
analyze the quantifier-external examples as in (19b) as also involving LF movement of the IHRC,
but a QP on -ígíí stranded in the matrix clause at LF:
(i) [IHRC Mary spun the wool] & [ Alice dyed IGII half ]  Mary spun the wool and Alice
dyed half the wool that Mary spun.
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Figure 3 Seven horses in total: three horses roped and branded
At this point, we might be tempted to propose that Navajo quantifiers ’ałníí’dóó
and t’áá ’ałtso have different scope when pronounced in relative clauses: while
’ałníí’dóó can be interpreted RC-internally, some factor forces t’áá ’ałtso to take
high scope. Precedent for such divergent quantifier behavior comes from Hastings
(2004), who demonstrates for Imbabura Quechua that while all quantifiers can be
pronounced RC-internally, only weak quantifiers like pisi ‘a little’ are interpreted
RC-internally; strong quantifiers like tukuy ‘all’ always has RC-external scope.
A proposal of this shape faces several possible problems. To start, Hastings’s
account relies on the distinction between weak and strong quantifiers to explain
the scopal facts in Imbabura Quechua, but it is not clear that ’ałníí’dóó ‘half’ is a
weak quantifier in Navajo, or whether a weak/strong distinction quantifier distinc-
tion even operates in the language.
We have also identified another reason to doubt that Navajo sentences with RC-
internal t’áá ’ałtso (25a) have the truth conditions of EHRCs like (25c). We identi-
fied one type of context where judgments for the Navajo sentence with RC-internal
t’áá ’ałtso (25a) diverged from judgments for sentences with the universal quan-
tifier in RC-external position. In Figure 4, there are again seven horses (Panel 1),
three of which are roped by Sam (Panel 2). This time, however, Tom brands two
other horses in addition to the three that were roped (Panel 3).
Both the English EHRC (25c) and the Navajo sentence with RC-external t’áá
’ałtso (25b) were accepted without hesitation in this context. However, the response
to (25a) in this context was more complex, as shown by the comments shown below.
(27) Context: Figure 4
a. #(25a): “Sounds like you’re saying Sam roped all of the horses and
Tom branded them...It’s just okay if you don’t worry about the plus
two others [that got branded]. Or say ‘...and then he roped two more.’"
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Figure 4 Seven horses total: three horses roped, five horses branded
b. (25b) accepted.
We note that the same judgment was elicited for (25a) in modified versions of
Figure 4 that contained different numbers of horses but where, in every case, the
roped horses were a subset of the branded horses. Each time, the consultant gave a
comment that highlighted the inequality of the two sets.
To summarize, the Navajo sentence with RC-external t’áá ’ałtso ‘all’ (25b)
seems to have the same truth conditions as the English EHRC in (25c). Further-
more, the Navajo sentence with RC-internal t’áá ’ałtso (25a) was felicitous in con-
texts where it was not the case that all of the horses were roped, in accordance
with Faltz (1995, 2000) and Grosu (2012). However, while (25a) does not have
precisely the truth conditions expected under a Shimoyama-style account, neither
does it have precisely the truth conditions of sentences with the universal quantifier
in RC-external position. Notably, pronouncing t’áá ’ałtso RC-internally seemed to
require equivalence between the individuals described by the relative clause and the
individuals that exhaustively satisfy the main clause.
Before turning to possible explanations for this observation, we observe that
Navajo may not be the only Dene language for which such judgments arise. The
northern Dene language Tłi˛cho˛ allows quantifiers — including universal quantifier
hazo˛ò˛ (28) — in RC-internal position (Mantla, Moulton & Saxon In prep.). Note
that Tłi˛cho˛ marks relative clauses with a nominalization suffix, whose exponent
surfaces as lengthening of the verb stem’s final vowel (Saxon 2000). We gloss this
marker as IGII for consistency with our discussion of Navajo.
(28) Leslıe
Leslie
elà
boat
hazo˛ò˛
all
whehtsi˛-i˛
PFV.make-IGII
daele
IPFV.float
‘All the boats Leslie made are floating.’ (Mantla et al. In prep.)
A storyboard was presented to the Tłı˛cho˛ language consultant which depicted
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all of Leslie’s boats floating on the water, as well as one additional boat not made
by Leslie on the water and the remainder of boats not made by Leslie on the shore.
In this context it is true that all of the Leslie-made boats are floating (an external
interpretation of ‘all’). Interestingly, however, the consultant rejected (28) in this
context, pointing out that there is a boat on the water that is not made by Leslie.
The consultant offered (29) instead, adding sentential negation le.
(29) Leslıe
Leslie
elà
boat
hazo˛ò˛
all
whehtsi˛-i˛
PFV.make-IGII
daele-le
IPFV.float-NEG
‘It is not the case that all the boats Leslie made are floating.’
(Mantla et al. In prep.)
At present we have not yet compared (28) with a minimally-different exam-
ple where the quantifier is RC external in Tłı˛cho˛. However, the comment in (28)
suggests that there must be equivalence between the individuals described by the
relative clause (Leslie-made boats) and the individuals that exhaustively satisfy the
matrix predicate (floating boats). The judgments for Tłı˛cho˛, then, are intriguingly
similar to what we observed for Navajo.7
4.2 The illusion of high scope by t’áá ’ałtso ‘all’
The complexity of the results for t’áá ’ałtso ‘all’ contrasts with the behavior of RC-
internal ’ałníí’dóó ‘half,’ which seems straightforwardly amenable to Shimoyama’s
(1999) analysis of IHRCs. On the other hand, when t’áá ’ałtso occurs RC-internally,
the truth conditions are not precisely what we would expect for either IHRCs or
EHRCs with universal quantifiers (30):
(30) [Sam
S.
łí˛í˛’
horse
t’áá ’ałtso
all
deizloh]-á˛a˛
PL3OBJ.3SBJ.rope.PFV-IGII
Tom
T.
yída’diiłid.
PL.3OBJ.3SBJ.brand.PFV
a. Set of branded horses must equal set of roped horses (not a require-
ment of EHRCs).
b. Set of roped horses can be smaller than domain of horses in context
(not expected to be permitted for IHRCs).
We will not give a full solution to the puzzle posed by t’áá ’ałtso, but instead
describe one conceivable direction and highlight potential challenges for it. We
start with the observation that when (30) occurs in a context like Figure 3 — where
7 In some respects, these judgments resemble quantifier spreading in the acquisition literature (Philip
1995), although we have not explored this connection deeply.
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we own seven horses and three are both roped and branded — it is not true that
all horses in the set of owned horses were roped, but it is true that all horses in a
smaller set of horses — the branded horses — were roped. Could t’áá ’ałtso in 3
be quantifying over this more restricted set of horses?
We must, of course, have in general a mechanism for restricting the domain of
quantifiers (Westerståhl 1985; von Fintel 1994; inter alia). If (31) is uttered in a
context where we own seven horses, the sentence conveys that Sam roped members
of the restricted set of horses (C), not that he roped every horse in the world.
(31) Sam
S.
łí˛í˛’
horse
táá ’ałtsoC
all
deizloh.
PL.3OBJ.3SBJ.rope.PFV
‘Sam roped allC the horses.’
An appeal to saliency might help us to explain the restricted domain of t’áá
’ałtso. At the point in Figure 3 where the sentence with t’áá ’ałtso occurs, Tom’s
branding has just been mentioned, making the three horses very salient and topical,
perhaps even more so than the seven horses. When uttered in such a context, then,
perhaps C is equal to the set of branded horses. In another context — such as Figure
4, discussed below — the valuation of C could be different.
If domain restriction can works this way, then, it would be possible to apply
Shimoyama’s (1999) analysis of IHRCs, which we sketched for Navajo in section
3.2. As before, the matrix object position would be filled by -IGII (32a). If -ígíí is
maximalizing like Japanese no, then we correctly predict the desired equivalence
between the branded horses and the roped horses.
(32) a. [IHRC Sam roped allC the horses] & [ Tom branded IGII2 ]
b. gc := [2! lxe. x is a horse that Sam roped ]
We now turn to the infelicity of (30) in Figure 4. Here, a natural value for the
domain C of t’áá ’ałtso be the five branded horses, since that is the last set of horses
mentioned before the sentence with t’áá ’ałtso is uttered. But then if this were the
domain for the quantifier in the IHRC, it is not true that Sam roped all of those five
horses in Figure 4, and (30) is accordingly rejected. If it is possible at all for C to
be equated to just three horses, this seems to take some work, as indicated by the
consultant’s comment about “ignoring” the other horses.
Under the story we have described so far, the ‘high scope’ of t’áá ’ałtso claimed
by Faltz (1995, 2000) and Grosu (2012) is an illusion. The reading of interest results
from a domain of quantification that is restricted in a special way. The quantifier
still takes scope internal to the relative clause. Applying this idea to the familiar
‘cars’ example, we can imagine (33) being uttered in a context where the set of cars
that run well is salient, such that this is the domain of quantification for t’áá ’ałtso,
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rather than the set of all cars on the lot.
(33) [John
John
Bill
Bill
t’áá ’ałtso
all
chidí
car
yaa
3OBJ.from
nayiisnii’]=é˛e˛
3OBJ.3SBJ.buy.PFV=IGII
t’éiya
only
nizhónígo
well
nidaajeeh.
3S.run.plural.actors.IPFV
Translation from Faltz and Grosu: ‘All the cars that John bought from Bill
(and only those) run well.’ (Faltz 1995: 106, 107)
The morphology of Navajo t’áá ’ałtso might give us a reason to consider an
account that relies heavily on quantifier domain restriction. Marti (2003) argues
that C should be represented formally as a covert pronoun. We observe that Navajo
t’áá ’ałtso always bears morphological markers for person and number (34), just
like those found on verbs. We would like to speculate that the pronominal marking
on forms of t’áá ’ałtso in (33) is an overt realization of Marti’s proposed pronoun.
(34) a. t’áá ’ałtso ‘all of them’ 3SBJ: ?
b. t’áá ’aniiltso ‘all of us’ 1PL.SBJ: iid
c. t’áá ’anółtso ‘all of you’ 2PL.SBJ: oh
The presence of pronominal marking is apparently relatively unique to t’áá ’ałtso:
’ałníí’dóó ‘half,’ for instance, does not have such marking. Thus, we do not predict
’ałníí’dóó to exhibit the effects of an exceptionally restricted domain that we claim
hold for t’áá ’ałtso.
An English paraphrase with meaning similar to what we intend is all them
horses, where the pronoun them can restrict the domain of quantification to a salient
subset of horses in the context. The contexts presented in Figure 3 and Figure 4 dif-
fer in what subsets are made salient. In the English paraphrase of Figure 3 (35),
English they and all them horses can pick out a subset of horses in the global do-
main, i.e. the three roped horses. In the English paraphrase of Figure 4 (36), by
contrast, them preferentially picks out five horses horses in the domain; reference
to the subset of three is anomalous.
(35) Figure 3: English version
There are seven horses on our ranch. Sam roped three of them. Tom
branded those threee horses. They j/all them j horses were Clydesdales.
j = the 3 horses
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(36) Figure 4: English version
Sam roped three horses. Tom branded those three horses plus two others.
They j/all them j horses were Clydesdales.
#j = the three horses; j = the five horses
However, there is a problem. This account would, ideally, apply to all uses of
t’áá ’ałtso, even outside of IHRCs. However, (37) shows that t’áá ’ałtso is rejected
apparently because a smaller salient (most recently mentioned) set of horses (three
branded) cannot function as the domain of quantification.
(37) a. Context: Figure 3. Seven horses in total. Three horses are roped by
Sam, then those three horses branded by Tom.
b. #Sam
S.
łí˛í˛’
horse
táá ’ałtso
all
deizloh.
PL.3OBJ.3SBJ.rope.PFV
‘Sam roped all the horses.’
Comment: “This isn’t good because he didn’t rope all the horses, he
just roped three of them.”
This suggests that even if a domain restriction approach is appealing, it must some-
how be restricted to quantifiers inside IHRCs.
5 Conclusion
We have considered the semantics of Navajo IHRCs with quantified heads. We ar-
gue that ’ałníí’dóó ‘half’ unambiguously takes scope RC-internally. As such, any
claim that quantifiers scope outside of relative clauses (Faltz 1995, 2000; Grosu
2012) is not universally valid in Navajo. We also presented new elicitation data
about the scope of t’áá ’ałtso ‘all,’ which was the original focus of Faltz and Grosu
(2012)’s claims. We demonstrated that while IHRCs with t’áá ’ałtso do not have
precisely the truth conditions expected for EHRCs, their truth conditions differ from
what might be expected given a Shimoyama-style IHRC analysis. However, we pre-
sented one way in which we might reconcile our observations with a Shimoyama-
style account by manipulating the domain of t’áá ’ałtso.
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